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THE CONTRACT THESIS OF THE FEDERAL SPENDING POWER
DAVID E. ENGDAHLt
In South Dakota v. Dole1 in 1987, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist listed
four "general restrictions" on Congress' spending power he said were
"articulated in our cases." 2 Only one of these is of great practical significance,
and it (or rather, its foundation) is the subject of this article. 3
Quoting from his own 1981 opinion for the Court in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman,4 Rehnquist wrote in Dole: "Second, we have required
that if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must
do so unambiguously.. . , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.' 5  This
requirement, however, is only one of several corollaries to be drawn from the
foundational insight recovered (but stated with unwarranted restraint) in
Pennhurst: the thesis that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is
much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States [or other
recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." 6
t Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
2. Id. at 207.
3. The restriction on which the majority focused in Dole was that "other constitutional provisions
may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds." Id. at 208. Apart from the
two dissenters, the Justices took this to mean not that Congress is precluded from manipulating its
spending to promote "objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly," but only that
spending "may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional." Id. at 210. The Court found nothing offensive to this restriction in Dole - or in other
cases it has considered since, such as Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S.
47 (2006), and United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). Another of Rehnquist's
"general restrictions" was that conditions must not be "unrelated to" the federal interest or purpose in a
grant. This "germaneness" requirement has no substance. It was contrived by amicus counsel in Dole
from scattered dicta, and Justice O'Connor made it the chief ground of her dissent. She recited it again
five years later in the majority opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172 (1992), but only
as a dictum it would have been superfluous for others to disavow. I have already critiqued the
germaneness notion elsewhere. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 54-62
(1994). Suffice it here to say that adding any condition(s) to a grant adds ipsofacto to the purpose(s) of
that grant, so that "unrelated" conditions are logically impossible. For example, adding conditions
against discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or handicap made the elimination of such discrimination
an additional federal purpose, common to numerous spending programs the other purposes of which
vary widely. Significantly, the Supreme Court has never invalidated a spending condition on the
"germaneness" ground; and no Justice has even mentioned it recently, except once in a footnote in a
dissent. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 689 n.3 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia,
J.). A third restriction listed in Dole is actually groundless, albeit frequently recited. Rehnquist said,
"the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare."' Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
But this is tautological, for "[w]hen money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of
welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937). The
error underlying the conventional focus on this "general welfare" phrase has serious consequences, to be
noted in due course below; but the imagined "general welfare restriction" on spending objectives is
nothing but empty words: No spending program or condition ever has been (or conceivably will be)
held to violate this requirement.
4. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
5. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
6. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. Rehnquist continued:
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." There can, of course, be
no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
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Over the past twenty years, acceptance or rejection of this thesis, and
admission or denial of its corollaries, has split the Justices into two essentially
equal camps, alternating in the majority. The most recent changes in the
composition of the Court do not so much change the number, as seemingly
enhance the conviction and resolve, of those Justices who acknowledge the
"contract thesis" of the spending power.
Certainly Congress can simply give money away, donating with no
"strings" attached, and sometimes it has done so. Typically, however, Congress
conditions disbursements. In the case of procurements, for example, it can
specify what a supplier is expected to provide; in the case of grants or loans or
loan guarantees, Congress can specify eligibility criteria and the efforts or
accomplishments the largesse is calculated to encourage, facilitate, or reward.
For at least sixty years now, funding conditions have also been used to advance
policy objectives peripheral or unrelated to the spending programs themselves,
such as curtailing partisan political activity by public employees, 7 eliminating
discrimination based on race or sex, separating abortion advocacy from funded
public health services, 9 and improving the lot of the handicapped.' 0  Funds
offered on conditions are only vouch-safed so long as the would-be recipient
accepts the conditions; and so, except for unconditional donations, federal
spending always involves contract.
The contract thesis operated during the nineteenth century regarding
conditioned grants of federal land, including (among other examples) homestead
and railroad grants to induce settlement and development of the American
West.11  It is enough for present purposes, however, to trace it to the early
twentieth century, when federal taxation of incomes was producing a revenue
stream greater than the normal costs of defense and federal government
operations, and federal spending programs on the modem pattern began to
appear and be litigated.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon 12 in 1923, the Supreme Court considered the
"Maternity Act,' ' 13 which authorized grants to states that agreed to a
congressionally-designed program promoting maternal and infant health. The
Justices in Mellon unanimously found no justiciable constitutional objection to
expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we
enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. Hatch Act, ch. 410, § 12, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 54 Stat. 767).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (prohibiting racial discrimination in
federally-funded programs); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in
education programs receiving federal assistance).
9. Public Health Service Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2000). See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991).
10. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
11. See generally Engdahl, supra note 3, at 31-33.
12. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
13. Act ofNov. 23, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-97, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
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Congress manipulating its resources to induce compliance with its wishes
regarding matters
outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution .... Nothing
is added by ... the further incidental allegations that the ulterior purpose
of Congress thereby was to induce the States to yield a portion of their
sovereign right[s.] ... If Congress enacted [the Maternity Act] with the
ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose may be
effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.
1 4
The Justices in Mellon thus unanimously acknowledged:
(1) that Congress may utilize federal funds to induce behavior the
Constitution gives it no power to require; in other words, it can spend to promote
objectives extraneous to the enumerated powers;
(2) that there is nojusticiable objection to its so doing; but
(3) that Congress' purpose in so doing can be frustrated simply by
disagreement, because no obligation to comply with Congress' extraneous
objectives can arise except from voluntary agreement as consideration for the
federal funds. 15
Certainly Congress has legislative power only so far as the Constitution
endows, 16 and the scope and limits of its legislative powers certainly are
justiciable.17  Moreover, because of the Supremacy Clause, 18 Congress'
legislative powers cannot be avoided by simply opting out. It therefore appears
that the Justices in Mellon understood that Congress' power to spend money is
not a legislative power. Our Constitution does contemplate - and in some
instances, even specifies - that Congress will have certain non-legislative
1 9
14. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482.
15. Id. at 479-83.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress .... Id. (emphasis added). "Herein" must be taken as referring to the whole Constitution,
and not only Article I, because power that is legislative in character is also conferred elsewhere in the
Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for appointment of "inferior Officers");
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (prescribing venue for crimes not committed within any state); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3 (declaring punishment for treason); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (prescribing effect, and
manner of proof, of sister-state acts, records, and judicial proceedings); U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2;
XIV, § 5; XV, § 2; XIX; XXIII, § 2; XXIV, § 2; XXVI, § 2 (enforcement powers); and certain
provisions of amends. XX and XXV. On few and dubious occasions, the Supreme Court has resorted to
arguments of "implied" or "inherent" powers to uphold a legislative act of Congress, or its application in
a particular case. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (upholding Fugitive Slave Act);
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1884) (upholding law punishing racial voter intimidation
despite absence of state action). See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1900); In re
Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892); United
States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 80 (1884). To the contrary, however, see Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 18 (1906). As to international affairs, however, the principle of enumerated powers is largely
inapplicable to both executive and legislative branch actions. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396, 405-06 (1933);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 603-04, 606 (1889). See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 20 n.16 (2d ed. 1996).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States . I..." d.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "[T]he Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
19. Among the powers constitutionally vested in Congress that seem non-legislative in character
[Vol. 52
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powers. 20 The power to spend - like the powers to receive and hold property, to
make contracts, and to sue for injuries like trespass and waste2 1 - inhere in every
body politic as an artificial person: "[T]he powers of the United States as a
sovereign.., must not be confounded with their rights as a body politic....
The restraints of the Constitution upon their sovereign powers cannot affect
[what mid-nineteenth century lawyers referred to as] their civil rights."22
(even if performed in conventional parliamentary form - i.e., by bill or resolution, and even if with
presentment) are those conferred by, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (consent to state "Agreement[s]
or Compact[s]," tonnage duties, or state troops or ships, or state engagement in war); U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2 (admission of new states and management and disposal of United States property); U.S.
CONST. art. V (proposing, or calling conventions for proposing, constitutional amendments); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXV (determining presidential inability or ability to discharge duties of office). From
time to time, some of these have been mistakenly regarded by courts (even by the Supreme Court, and
even within the past few decades) as legislative powers; but the historical mainline of the case law, and
the principled common sense of the provisions in context, is to the contrary. Documentation of the
previous sentence is far beyond the scope of this article, but for thorough discussion of certain examples
see David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976);
David E. Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L.
REV. 987 (1965). There also is some narrow room to argue for "implicit" or "inherent" non-legislative
powers in Congress or in its respective houses, and in the other branches. See, e.g., Michaelson v. U.S.
ex rel. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (discussing judicial contempt power); In re Neagle, 135 U.S.
1 (1890) (discussing U.S. Marshall protection of a federal judge); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821)
(stating that the House has "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed" to punish for
contempt in its presence).
20. The Constitution does give Congress control over spending by providing that "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law[.]" See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 7. This procedural safeguard, however, does not make the act of spending any more
legislative in character than does the keeping, or the publication "from time to time," of "a regular
Statement and account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money .. " Id.
21. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229 (1850); United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. 120
(1845) (holding that the United States is entitled to injunction restraining waste on the public lands). A
similar course of reasoning might arguably be sufficient to justify resort to judicial redress to protect the
United States' interests, even in the promotion of policies within its legislative power, without the
extreme, unwarrantable, and superfluous rhetoric indulged in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
22. Cotton, 52 U.S. at 231. A dozen years ago, I argued at length that the spending power was
conferred by the Constitution's "property clause," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. David E. Engdahl, The
Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215 (1995). Late in 2002, however, I came to
realize - and changed my classroom materials to begin teaching - that the principle of enumerating
powers has no application to the ordinary capacities (or "powers") of legal personhood; the enumeration
technique was devised as a way to prevent concentration only of governance powers. The traditional,
but indefensible, attribution of the spending power to inference from the taxing clause, Article I, Section
8, clause 1, traces all the way back to Hamilton's time; but its age lends it no merit. No conceivable
construction of that taxing clause can afford power to spend the hundreds of billions of dollars in budget
deficits fattening the accumulated $8.5 trillion debt borrowed on the credit of the United States under
Article 1, Section 8, clause 2. Neither can it serve as authority to spend the revenue engendered by
permits, licenses, and other regulations under the "commerce clause," for example; or federal court fees
and penal fines; or royalties, rents, and returns on federal investments; or gifts and bequests; or proceeds
from the sale or disposal of federal property; or funds from a host of other non-tax sources that happen to
find their way into the national Treasury. Despite the Articles of Confederation's even more rigorous
foreclosure of national powers not clearly "expressed" - and despite the absence from those Articles of
any "taxing clause" - the Continental Congress had spent for a war and a decade of operations and
diplomatic efforts, and also made substantial donations to needy native tribes and to disaster victims
abroad. Plainly, no one then imagined that a power to spend - an ordinary capacity inherent in legal
personhood - could not be exercised without a constitutional "grant of power!" In any event, even if one
should insist upon hanging the modem Congress' spending power on the Constitution's taxing power
hook - i.e., if one regards that clause as authority for Congress to spend for whatever Congress considers
useful to "provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States" - still nothing
more than spending per se toward those purposes can be regarded as authorized by the clause. See infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
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It is true that the terms defining eligibility for federal grants,2 3 and the
conditions that are to accompany federal funds, are specified by Congress in
statutory form; but unlike statutory provisions that are grounded in Congress'
legislative powers, spending terms and conditions are obligatory and enforceable
only if voluntarily accepted - only if agreed to by a recipient as quid pro quo.
While articulated in statutory form, they are not statutory in their effect: They
have no force at all as "law," but rather are binding, if at all, only by virtue of
contract.
24
This, among other things,25 is what Massachusetts v. Mellon stands for.
This is the "contract thesis" of the spending power. The contract thesis is
integral to Alexander Hamilton's classic view of the spending power, which is
the indisputably settled rule.2 6 Hamilton maintained that Congress has power to
spend, not just to fund its enumerated powers (as James Madison famously
maintained 27), but generally for the common good. 2 8 Hamilton also took care to
explain that "[a] power to appropriate money with this latitude.., would not
carry a power to do any other thing, not authorised [sic] in the Constitution[.] ' 29
This is a point that Madison, as Hamilton's critic, seems to have missed.3 °
However, Madison's neighbor, friend, and fellow Jeffersonian (and successor to
Madison as President), James Monroe, understood the point,3 1 and demonstrated
23. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136 (1947).
24. See Engdahl, supra note 3, for more complete discussion of the principle of enumerated powers
and the nature of the spending power.
25. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), along with the companion case decided with it,
Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F. 252 (D.C Cir. 1923), is well known as a classic case on the issue of
"standing" in federal courts.
26. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
640 (1937) (stating that "[tihe conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and strongly
reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison").
27. See, e.g., Speech in the First Congress, Third Session (Feb. 2, 1791), reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 19, 28 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906); Letter from James Madison to Andrew
Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 411, 418-19 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1906); James Madison, Veto Message (1817), reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS 584 (1896). See generally Engdahl, supra note 3, at 27-28.
28. Hamilton argued that the power to spend is not confined to objects within the enumerated
powers, because
otherwise numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would have been left without a
provision.... [lit was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its
revenues should have been restricted within narrower limits than the "General Welfare" and...
this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of
specification nor of definition. It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the National
Legislature, to pronounce, upon the objects, which concern the general Welfare, and for which
under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems no
room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of Agriculture of
Manufactures and of Commerce are within the sphere of the national Councils as far as regards
an application of Money. The only qualification of the generality of the Phrase in question,
which seems to be admissible, is this - That the object to which an appropriation of money is to
be made must be General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility,
throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular spot.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 303 (Harold C. Syrett et al. ed., 1966) (emphasis in original).
29. Id. at 304.
30. See Supplement to the letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 27, at 418.
31. With regard to Madison's view, Monroe confessed: "To this construction I was inclined in the
[Vol, 52
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his understanding by vetoing a bill for construction of the Cumberland Road
because, beyond paying the cost, it contemplated federal maintenance and
protection of the Road, and criminal jurisdiction over it. As Monroe explained:
The right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the
public money to this or that purpose. It has no incidental power .... All
that Congress could do under it in the case of internal improvements
would be to appropriate the money necessary to make them. For every act
requiring legislative sanction or support the State authority must be relied
on. The condemnation of the land, if the proprietors should refuse to sell
it, the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work
when finished must be done by the State. To these purposes the powers
of the General Government are believed to be utterly incompetent .... I
think I am authorized to conclude that... [Congress has] nothing more
than a right to appropriate the public money; ... that although the right to
appropriate the public money to such improvements affords a resource
indispensably necessary to such a scheme, it is nevertheless deficient as a
power in the great characteristics on which its execution depends.
32
Hamilton himself, unlike Monroe, might have found Congress competent to
build and maintain roads as a means of defense, or to promote its policy for
interstate commerce, 33 but so far as concerns the spending power alone, the
limitations Monroe perceived were those to which Hamilton himself had
referred.
No less than Monroe, President Andrew Jackson perceived the point that
Madison had missed. When Congress in 1830 presented the Maysville Road
Bill, which resembled the Cumberland Road Bill of Madison's day, Jackson
vetoed it on equivalent grounds, explaining:
Assuming the right to appropriate money to aid in the construction of
national works to be warranted by the contemporaneous and continued
exposition of the Constitution, its insufficiency for the successful
prosecution of them must be admitted by all candid minds.... [Without]
the right to exercise as much jurisdiction as is necessary to preserve the
works and to raise funds by the collection of tolls to keep them in repair,
nothing extensively useful can be effected.
34
The Hamiltonian (and historically mainline and orthodox) understanding is
that Congress may spend -just as any other entity or person might spend - to
induce compliance with its wishes about anything at all. However, its ability to
more early stage of our Government; but on further reflection and observation my mind has undergone a
change .... JAMES MONROE, VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 165 (James D. Richardson, ed., Government Printing Office,
1896).
32. MONROE, supra note 31.
33. Certainly modems would have no difficulty defending federal road-building on these grounds;
but although Monroe had come to share Hamilton's understanding of the spending power, as to
Congress' power under the "necessary and proper" clause Monroe still clung to Jefferson's erroneous
restrictive view.
34. ANDREW JACKSON, VETO OF THE MAYSVILLE ROAD BILL (1830), reprinted in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 490-92 (James D.
Richardson, ed., Government Printing Office 1896) (1896).
2007]
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control outcomes, to prevent frustration of its chosen objectives - no less than its
ability to coerce - is constitutionally confined within the limits of its enumerated
lawmaking powers. Outside those limits (in other words, with regard to
extraneous objectives) the United States like any other entity or person can use
contracts to obligate funding recipients to perform as it desires; but except
insofar as some end within an enumerated legislative power 35 is served, it is only
by virtue of contract that federal funding can entail federal control.
36
The contract thesis manifested in Mellon, however, was relegated to
oblivion thirteen years later when the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Butler.37  Although four in Butler's majority and one of those in dissent had
participated in deciding Mellon, both of the Butler opinions were written by
newcomers; and neither of them, on that occasion, exhibited a competent grasp
of either Hamilton's or Mellon's rationale. Justice Owen J. Roberts for the
majority flatly contradicted the Hamiltonian view while purporting to endorse it;
he wrote: "Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the
ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not
indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase
compliance."
38
And to the Mellon thesis that a state may frustrate spending objectives "by
the simple expedient of not yielding" (which, on the differing facts of Butler,
would have meant forbidding farmers within the state's jurisdiction to comply
with the conditions required), Justice Roberts answered:
The argument is plainly fallacious. The United States can make the
contract only if the federal power to tax and to appropriate reaches the
subject-matter of the contract. If this does reach the subject-matter, its
exertion cannot be displaced by state action. To say otherwise is to deny
the supremacy of the laws of the United States; to make them subordinate
to those of a state. This would reverse the cardinal principle embodied in
the Constitution and substitute one which declares that Congress may only
effectively legislate as to matters within federal competence when the
states do not dissent.
39
35. Remember that Congress' power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" its own (as well as the other branches') other powers, is itself an enumerated
power- a fact easily obscured by the unfortunate error of calling Article I, Section 8, clause 18 the
source of "implied" legislative powers. However, that clause can only be invoked where the targeted
objective is within the scope of another federal power; it does not authorize using otherwise extraneous
means to help attain ends which themselves are extraneous, although promoted by the use of some other
federal power as a means.
36. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942), it was observed that "[i]t is hardly lack of due
process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes." That might be true as to the due
process issue; but it begs the question of power. The power exercised in Wickard was explained in that
opinion as based on the "necessary and proper" clause as a means to interstate commerce policy ends,
and the resulting "subsidy" to the farmer (i.e., the production controls' enhancement of the market price
of wheat) was not regarded as justifying the production controls at all.
37. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Butler invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat.
31 (1933) (providing for payments to farmers agreeing to reduce acreage in production).
38. Butler, 297 U.S. at 74.
39. Id. Notice the fundamental nature of Roberts' failure: He missed Hamilton's whole point that
Congress can fiscally "reach" matters it cannot legislatively control - can spend for objectives that are
not within federal legislative "competence" at all.
[Vol. 52
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This is a classic example of the mistaken "dual federalist" distortion of what the
principle of enumerated powers means.
4 0
But Justice Harlan F. Stone for the Butler dissenters made essentially the
same mistake, by thinking that spending (or taxing) objectives must fall within
an enumerated power. The difference was that Stone - supposing the spending
power to be conferred by the same clause that confers the taxing power4 1 -
construed its "general welfare" phrase as capacious enough to embrace any
disbursement that might be considered to redound to the public good. He
therefore thought it material to assert that, because
the present depressed state of agriculture is nation wide in its extent and
effects, there is no basis for saying that the expenditure of public money
in aid of farmers is not within the specifically grantedPower of Congress
to levy taxes to "provide for the ... general welfare."
Whereas the unanimous Court in Mellon had countenanced spending to promote
goals "outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution," 4 3 Stone in
Butler reasoned that "the expenditure of funds... in aid of a program of
curtailment of production of agricultural products, and thus of a supposed]
better ordered national economy, is within the specifically granted power.'"
Thus, even while affirming that "[t]he spending power of Congress is in addition
to the legislative power and not subordinate to it," Stone in Butler mistook the
"general welfare" phrase as a limit (albeit a modest one) to Congress' spending
power.
45
40. The theory of "dual federalism," which grew in popularity and dominated judicial thinking for
a century following the 1835 death of John Marshall, regards the clauses of the Constitution that
enumerate Congress' "powers" as delimiting the ends that Congress may promote, rejecting the use of
such "powers" as tools to promote "extraneous" ends. Having predominated in constitutional
jurisprudence since shortly after John Marshall's death, dual federalism met its deserved demise. See
infra note 53 and accompanying text.
41. Article I, Section 8, clause I provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Notice that this clause says absolutely
nothing about spending, but even Alexander Hamilton attributed Congress' spending power to this
clause, and the uncritical, plainly mistaken habit of doing so has continued. Justice Roberts in Butler,
trying to defend the habit, explained it in a way that exposes its incompatibility with the "enumerated
powers" doctrine that (wrongly) had made it seem necessary to find a textual basis for it in the first
place. Justice Roberts stated:
The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. Funds in
the Treasury as a result of taxation ... can never accomplish the objects for which they were
collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax. [Therefore the]
implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated "to provide
for the general welfare of the United States."
297 U.S. at 65. To highlight some of the flaws in this explanation, consider: Wouldn't the same logic
make superfluous the specific grants of power to support armies and maintain a navy? By what logic
could this clause support ever spending funds derived other than from taxes - such as from sale or
leasing of public land, from regulatory licenses or penal fines, or (highly significant in modem practice)
from exercise of Congress' borrowing power. The traditional attribution of the spending power to this
source simply cannot withstand thoughtful reflection; it is plainly erroneous, and unworthy of continued
pretension. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for further thoughts on the basis of the
spending power.
42. Butler, 297 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
43. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (emphasis added).
44. Butler, 297 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 85.
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The following year, when Justice Cardozo (who also was new to the Court
since Mellon) wrote for the newly emergent majority in the Social Security Act
cases, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and Helvering v. Davis,47 he simply
repeated Justice Stone's error. The problems of unemployment and old-age
indigence had become "national in area and dimensions," Cardozo observed,48
and the states by themselves had proven unable to deal effectively with them.49
Evidently Cardozo assumed that, had it been otherwise, federal spending in an
effort to alleviate these problems could not have been constitutionally sustained.
Hamilton, in contrast, could have approved such expenditures just as easily
whether or not such matters were among those constitutionally entrusted to the
federal government's care. 50
Failing to understand Hamilton. . . , Cardozo thought it necessary to deny
that economic relief of the unemployed and elderly are "fields foreign to
[Congress's] function"; he thought it necessary to claim instead that such
welfare ends are "fairly within the scope of national policy and power."
But of course, they are not. They simply are extraneous ends toward
which (among innumerable others) Congress may spend.
Perhaps it was true, as Cardozo eloquently wrote, that there was "need
of help from the nation if the people were not to starve"; if so, however,
that was true exactly - and only - in the same sense that Hamilton had
believed there was need in 1791 for federal subsidy of manufacturing if
the young nation's scant economy was not to fail. Federal funds may be
spent to meet any such need, but neither the generality and urgency of the
need nor any decision to meet it can place such a matter among those
enumerated by the Constitution for the federal government's concern.
The essence of Hamilton's spending power view is precisely that
Congress may spend for matters that the Constitution does not designate
for the federal government's concern - that Congress may spend for
matters that (in terms of enumerated powers doctrine) are "foreign to
[Congress's] function" and are not "fairly within the scope of national
policy and power." 51
However, not until United States v. Darby52 four years later, where a
prohibition of interstate shipments to induce compliance with Congress' wishes
46. 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
47. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
48. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 586.
49. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
50. Hamilton instanced, for example, the "general Interests of learning, of Agriculture, of
Manufactures...." See HAMILTON, supra note 28, at 303. Endorsing Hamilton's view forty-five years
later, Justice Joseph Story observed:
There is no doubt that President Washington fully concurred in [Hamilton's] opinion, as his
repeated recommendations to Congress of objects of this sort, especially of the encouragement
of manufactures, of learning, of a university, of new inventions, of agriculture, of commerce and
navigation, of a military academy, abundantly prove.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND THE STATES BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 718 n. 1 (Melville M. Bigelow, ed., Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 5th
ed. 1905) (1891).
51. Engdahl, supra note 3, at 46-47 (internal citations omitted).
52. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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regarding wages and hours in local manufacturing was sustained, did a majority
of the Justices fully recover the general principle that extraneous objectives are
no constitutional obstacle to acts which - considered apart from those objectives
- are within Congress' power.53  This principle explains - far better than
opinions written at the time - why Congress could combat gambling and sexual
immorality,54 for example, or promote livestock health,55 or protect consumers
from impure and misbranded foods and drugs, 56 all by regulating interstate
transportation; why it could discourage the issuance of circulating bank notes
57
or the marketing of alternatives to butter, 58 or could encourage the conservation
of energy or the private ownership of homes, 59 all by the design of its taxes; and
why it could specify to whom electricity should be sold, as a condition of
permission to build hydroelectric facilities on federal land. The principle
applies as much to Congress' power to spend, as to any of its legislative powers.
Had this "extraneous ends" principle been so clearly perceived sooner, the
irrelevance of whether the Social Security Act's objectives were "fairly within
the scope of national policy and power,' 61 or instead were "foreign to
[Congress'] function, ' 62 would surely have been evident to Justice Cardozo and
the Helvering and Steward majorities, and Justice Stone dissenting in Butler
would not have imagined any need to assert that inducing farmers to curtail
agricultural production "is within the specifically granted power."
63
The misconception that "general welfare" aims are definitive of the
spending power 64 has caused serious confusion that still lingers today.
Recovering the contract thesis understood and applied in Mellon is integral to
overcoming this conceptual error, which Butler, Steward, and Helvering all share
in common.
Some federal spending conditions advance goals of a particular funding
program; but others apply much more broadly - to several programs, or to all.
An early example of the latter sort was a section of the 1939 Hatch Political
Activity Act that provided:
Sec. 12. (a) No officer or employee of any State or local agency whose
principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed
53. Id. at 112-17 (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)). Steps of transition
toward Darby's rediscovery of this principle had been evident in United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940), and United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940).
54. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
55. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414 (1926).
56. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45 (1911).
57. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
58. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
59. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 45L, 45M, 163(h)(3) (2000).
60. See United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940).
61. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
62. Id.
63. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 81 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
64. See supra note 40; see also supra note 22.
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in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any
Federal agency shall.., take any active part in political management or in
political campaigns.
6 5
Reflecting the Steward and Helvering misconception that any "general
welfare" aim of federal spending is ipso facto "within the scope of national
policy and power,' 66 this Hatch Act provision was drafted as if political activity
by state employees was a matter within Congress' power to control, for on its
face the prohibition was a directive not to the grantees, but to their employees.
The only consequence, however, of employee noncompliance (or of agency
failure to enforce employee compliance) would fall upon the employing grantee
agency: Its federal funding might be cut. Recognizing that the provision could
have no legal force except as a condition to federal funding, the Supreme Court
in the 1947 case of Oklahoma v. US. Civil Service Commission67 treated it as a
funding condition. The court reasoned that, by choosing to risk a loss of funding
by refusing to discipline the employee, "Oklahoma adopted the 'simple
expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion.... The offer of
benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon cooperation b ' the state
with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual."
Some more recent, and even more widely applicable, funding conditions
have been articulated in similar, prohibitory terms - although in passive instead
of active voice, and directed specifically at the funded entity rather than
nominally at the employee. Most notably these include the prohibition of race
discrimination in federally-funded programs, imposed by Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;69 the ban on sex discrimination in federally-funded
education programs, imposed by Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972; 70 and the restrictions on discrimination because of handicap in federally-
funded programs, imposed by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.71 These,
too, can have no legal effect whatsoever except by virtue of a recipient's
acceptance of them as among the conditions prerequisite to receiving federal
funds. However, the race, sex, and handicap anti-discrimination conditions
redound to the benefit of "third persons" - persons who receive no funds from
the federal government but whose interests those conditions are intended to
advance.
65. Act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended by Act of July 19, 1940, 54 Stat.
767).
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
68. Id. at 143-44 (referencing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). In other
respects, however, the Court deciding the Oklahoma case remained slave to the Steward and Helvering
misconception, thinking it necessary that "[t]he end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act" be
found within Congress' constitutional power, and supposing that "better public service" resulting from
the elimination of "active political partisanship" by state officials administering federal grant proceeds
could fulfill that necessity. Id. at 143.
69. § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
70. § 901, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
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In 1977, in Miree v. DeKalb County,72 the Supreme Court with no dissent
rejected an argument that federal rather than state law should govern third-party
beneficiaries' claims for violation of a federal funding condition. 73  As a
condition of grants for airport improvement, the County had undertaken to limit
land adjacent to its airport to uses compatible with takeoff and landing; but a
Lear jet carrying the plaintiffs' decedents had crashed when its engines were
fouled by birds swarming from a garbage dump maintained by the County.
74
The case was in federal court because of diversity, and the question for the
Supreme Court was whether state law or "principles of federal common law
were applicable to the resolution of petitioners' breach-of-contract claim."
75
Applying state law would mean that the law governing third-party claims
under federal grant conditions might vary from state to state. The Justices
decided, however, that such variations would be unobjectionable since a third-
party claim against a grant recipient "raises no question regarding the liability of
the United States or the responsibilities of the United States under the
contracts[,]" and the relevant operations of the United States would not "be
burdened or subjected to uncertainty by variant state-law interpretations
regarding whether those with whom the United States contracts might be sued by
third-party beneficiaries to the contracts."
76
Prior to Miree, the Supreme Court had found causes of action implied by
some regulatory statutes, although never for third-party beneficiaries of spending
conditions.7 7  Some lower federal courts, however, had found causes of action
for third-party spending beneficiaries to be implicit in Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, although those cases antedated 1975, the year the Supreme Court
articulated more demanding criteria for "determining whether a private remedy
72. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
73. Id. at 33. While there was no dissent, Chief Justice Burger separately concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 34.
74. Id. at 25 (majority opinion).
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 28-30. A requirement of compatibility with takeoff and landing might have been
sustainable under the necessary and proper clause as advancing Congress' policy for the safety of
interstate commerce by air. Congress might therefore have imposed it legislatively, instead of only as a
condition to be accepted in voluntary exchange for federal funds. Even if the former would have been
valid, however, Congress had elected to do only the latter. The Court of Appeals had nonetheless
considered the compatibility policy of such sufficient "federal interest" that the question of its third-party
enforceability should not be left to turn on state law. Id. at 28. The Supreme Court, however, reversed,
declaring that "even assuming the correctness of this notion .... the issue of whether to displace state
law on an issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress. Congress has chosen not to do so in
this case." Id. at 32.
77. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (discussing § lOb of
Securities Exchange Act); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 & 1982 (2000)); Allen v. State Brd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (discussing the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 found at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967)
(discussing the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (discussing
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
78. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 nn.20-21 (1979) (citing numerous
federal court decisions).
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is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one[.],, 79 The Court's holding in
Miree - that third-party beneficiaries have only such remedies as relevant state
law might provide - had come two years later, in 1977. 80 Considering all this,
the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1981 added to section 313 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts a subsection observing that the common law
principles applicable to private third-party beneficiary contracts are applicable
also to contracts with a government. 8 The ALI must have contemplated state
law regarding third-party beneficiaries, for Miree had not compromised the
premise that "[t]here is no federal general common law."
82
It therefore seems remarkable that in 1979, when a splayed Supreme Court
barely mustered a majority to dispose of Cannon v. University of Chicago,83 no
Justice even mentioned Miree.
84
The plaintiff in Cannon complained of being excluded from federally-
funded medical education programs of the University because of her sex,
contrary to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provided:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance[.]" 85 Title IX contained no language authorizing private suits for its
enforcement, but it was modeled after Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
86
which (as earlier noted) had already been held by some lower federal courts to
implicitly authorize private suits. 87 The plaintiff in Cannon sought a like ruling
under Title IX - which is worded just like Title VI except that it applies to
discrimination "on the basis of sex" rather than "on the ground of race, color, or
national origin," and is limited to "education" programs or activities.
8 8
Invidious discrimination on the basis of race or sex would be
unconstitutional if it were state action; and to that extent and for that reason it
could be made actionable by Congress as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. 89 Indeed, for that reason, it already had been made actionable to
that extent by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In most of the cases in which lower courts had
found implied causes of action under Title VI, § 1983 either had been, or could
have been, relied upon at least as an alternative ground. Ms. Cannon, however,
79. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
80. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 33 (1977).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(1) (1981). See also id. at ch. 14, introductory
note.
82. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
83. 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
84. See id. In 1979 the Justices' recovery of the contract thesis had not yet proceeded very far.
Furthermore, some of them might have been jaded enough by zeal for good causes that no application of
candid legal analysis could have deterred them from a holding they believed would promote the
righteous objectives of Title IX.
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
87. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-98 nn.20-21 (citing numerous federal court decisions).
88. Id. at 683-85.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. 14, cl. 5.
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could not state a claim under § 1983, because the defendant in her case was a
private university whose relevant acts could not be characterized as having been
done under color of law.
90
The lower-court cases under Title VI did include one in which, although
state action was absent, federal funding itself was taken as sufficient to entail
discrimination restraints that Congress otherwise could not have imposed on
private action.9 1 However, the district court deciding that case had expressly
refused to address the possible constitutional issues raised. 92  Perhaps he
imagined that federal funding could serve as a surrogate for state action; but he
did not say. More important, although that case was cited along with the other
Title VI cases in Cannon, the Justices in Cannon made no attempt to explain or
to justify its holding. Instead, the so-called "opinion of the Court" in Cannon
simply ignored the crucial difference between restraints accepted as conditions
of funding, and restraints imposed by virtue of a legislative power (e.g., the
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).93
The splay of judicial opinion in Cannon evidenced a transition of
understanding underway. Three Justices dissented on differing grounds, Justice
Powell urging that the practice of judicially inferring any private causes of action
be reconsidered entirely.94 Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's opinion, but in a
brief concurrence declared that the Court should be "extremely reluctant" to find
implied statutory rights of action in the future.95 Chief Justice Burger in Cannon
concurred only in the judgment, and wrote no opinion,9 6 but his unwillingness to
join the "opinion of the Court" is revealing: Eight years earlier he had spoken
out when other Justices attributed statutory force to spending conditions that he
realized were binding only because of consent;97 and no doubt Burger's insight
contributed to Rehnquist's recall and elaboration of the contract thesis two years
later in the Pennhurst opinion, which Burger joined.
Thus only three of the Justices - Stevens, the author, Brennan, and Marshall
- subscribed without qualification to the "opinion of the Court" in Cannon. That
opinion ignored the prerequisite of recipient assent, and treated the terms of Title
IX - just like the terms of statutory provisions regulating matters within
90. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
91. Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F.Supp. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972).
92. See id. at 1384.
93. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
94. Id. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote a
separate dissent. Id. at 718-30 (White, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). As to Title VI, and thus its virtual carbon copy in
Title IX, Rehnquist was persuaded to concur because "at least during the period of the enactment of the
several Titles of the Civil Rights Act" the judiciary had induced Congress "to rely to a large extent on
the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining this
question for itself." Id. at 718. Two years later, in the Pennhurst case, discussed below, Rehnquist
would write for a majority reasserting the forgotten fact that spending conditions are not even obligatory
as statutes, but only by virtue of recipient consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
96. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
97. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 292 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Congress' legislative powers - as creating "statutory rights":
98
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to
support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as
much when it creates those rights. But the Court has long recognized that
under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not
inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to
the persons benefited by its legislation.
99
For yet another year, a majority of the Justices failed to distinguish between
obligations voluntarily incurred and rights statutorily conferred. Thus, in Maine
v. Thiboutot100 not only Justices White and Blackmun, but also Justice Stewart,
joined with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens to comprise a majority
holding that § 1983 - which they newly construed to reach deprivations of non-
constitutional "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the.., laws" -
conferred a private cause of action for miscalculation and the resulting
underpayment of benefits a state was obligated to pay only because it had agreed
to participate in the federally-funded program of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, authorized by the Social Security Act.101  Although the obligation
arose solely from the state's agreement, the Thiboutot majority opinion referred
to the underpayments as "deprivations of statutory rights.'
1 2
At last, however, in 1981, writing for the Court in Pennhurst, Justice
Rehnquist resuscitated the contract thesis that had lapsed into obscurity after
Massachusetts v. Mellon.103 The thesis also occasionally surfaced again in the
decade following Pennhurst. In 1984, for example, Justice White for the Court
cited Pennhurst in holding that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and
unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational
institutions are not obligated to accept[,]" and that a college "may terminate its
participation in the... program and thus avoid the requirements" of Title IX. 
104
98. See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689-90, 698, 717. Private civil rights claims'might be sustained
under the "enforcement clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment (if state action is involved), or insofar as
deemed "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" Congress' will for interstate commerce
(regardless of state action). In Cannon, however, neither Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, concurring,
nor Justices White, Blackmun and Powell, dissenting, made anything of the crucial fact that the
University of Chicago - a private institution - could not be reached by Title IX on either of these
grounds.
99. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
100. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
101. Id. at4.
102. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
103. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Even Justice White in
Pennhurst, dissenting in part with Justices Brennan and Marshall - although he characterized the third-
party benefits as "statutory rights," id. at 52, and regarded jurisdiction over Halderman's claim as
"properly invoked.., under Thiboutot, id. at 53 - did acknowledge that a remedy which would be
appropriate
where state officials fail to observe the limits of their power under the United States Constitution
or fail to perform an ongoing statutory duty imposed by a federal statute enacted under the
commerce power or the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily the measure of a federal
court's authority where it is found that a State has failed to perform its obligations undertaken
pursuant to a statute enacted under the spending power. .... [T]he courts in such cases must take
account of the State's privilege to withdraw and terminate its duties under the federal law.
Id. at 53 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984).
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In another case decided the same day, Justice Powell for the Court observed
about § 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act 105 that Congress "determined that it
would require contractors and grantees to bear the costs of providing
employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for the receipt of federal
funds." 10 6 Two years later, Justice Powell for the Court invoked the contract
thesis again, this time to explain why the requirements of § 504 bind no one but
the funds' recipients themselves.
Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the
recipients of the funds: the recipient's acceptance of the funds triggers
coverage under the nondiscrimination provision.... Congress imposes
the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or
reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to
"receive" federal funds. 107
By 1992, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and
Powell all were gone from the Supreme Court, replaced by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Thus, only Rehnquist, Stevens, White,
and Blackmun remained from when Pennhurst was decided. The future course
of the struggle for complete recovery of the contract thesis was therefore
uncertain.
When the Court in that year held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools108 that damages were available to a third-party beneficiary student to
remedy a teacher's intentional sexual abuse and harassment contravening Title
IX (which was known to, and not deterred by, supervising authorities), the
Court's opinion written by Justice White failed to endorse the contract thesis,
10 9
and spoke instead of "Spending Clause statutes"110 and of causes of action
brought "pursuant to a federal statute."111 The opinion also relied upon non-
spending cases 1 12 for what White described as the "normal presumption in favor
of all appropriate remedies."
' 113
While there was no dissent in Franklin, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred only in the Judgment, and they explained
themselves in another case pending at the same time and decided just a month
later. In Suter v. Artist M.,114 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court
holding that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980115 was not
105. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). This section addresses handicap discrimination in terms substantially
equivalent to those of Title VI regarding race and Title IX regarding sex.
106. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984).
107. U.S. Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1986).
108. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
109. It was argued, citing Pennhurst, that a damages remedy was not foreseeable and thus, for lack
of notice, should not be available to enforce a spending condition; but the Court bluntly responded that
"(t]his notice problem does not arise... [where] intentional discrimination is alleged." Id. at 74-75.
110. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
112. See e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
113. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74.
114. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 620 (2000). This Act conditionally authorized reimbursements to states for a
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enforceable by a private action, either implicitly under the Adoption Act itself or
even under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In so holding, Rehnquist for the majority relied
heavily upon his Pennhurst opinion; its emphasis upon voluntary and knowing
acceptance of "the terms of the 'contract;"' its holding that "if Congress intends
to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously;"' 116 and the fact that the condition at issue in Suter was
unspecific and "does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the
Act's beneficiaries."
117
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens in dissent, accused the Suter
majority of contradicting the decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 118
just two years before, which had held enforceable under § 1983 what the Suter
dissenters described as a "functionally identical provision" of the Medicaid
Act.119  The Suter majority proffered some distinctions, but the essential
difference was that the Suter dissenters (like the majority opinion in Franklin)
ignored the contract thesis, and instead relied primarily on non-spending
cases. 120
Speaking of Franklin again, there is another point to be noted regarding
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion there. It asserted that the Court no longer
engages in "the expansive rights-creating approach exemplified by Cannon," and
that it "Rerhaps ought to abandon the notion of implied causes of action
entirely." However, while thus insisting that Cannon was no reliable guide
for the future, Scalia did not propose its abrogation, for he said:
I nonetheless agree with the Court's disposition of this case. Because of
legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, it is too late in the day to
address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title IX
would be appropriate. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2), must be read, in my view, not only "as a
validation of Cannon's holding," . . . but also as an implicit
acknowledgment that damages are available. 
12 2
Remember, though, that 1992 was still relatively early in the process of
recovering the contract thesis, and Scalia did not discuss - and no one seems to
have raised - the underlying constitutional question of whence (if at all)
portion of foster care and adoption assistance payments.
116. Suter, 503 U.S. at 356 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
117. Id. at 363.
118. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
119. Suter, 503 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. E.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103 (1989).
121. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). Scalia had played this theme before. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). "If a change is to be made, we should get out of the business of
implied private rights of action altogether." Id. at 192. At least, the concurring Justices maintained,
"when rights of action are judicially 'implied,' categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be
judicially implied as well." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77. This distinguished them from the majority's
anomalous view that there can be no limitations on an implied cause of action unless they are expressed.
122. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 78.
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Congress might derive power to create causes of action in third parties against
the recipients of federal funds (even if it were to do so explicitly). Even now,
indeed, no one seems to have noticed this question in any litigation; but we will
address it here before we are done. 
123
During the ensuing two years, Justices White and Blackmun retired and
were replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer respectively.
That left only two Pennhurst veterans on the Court. Although both of these had
been in the Pennhurst majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens
were to lead in opposite directions regarding the contract thesis while the Court's
personnel remained unchanged for the next eleven years. Among the Justices of
this period, in addition to Justice Stevens, Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
afforded the contract thesis no support. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, on the other hand, were its most constant
proponents. Justice O'Conner also applied the thesis, sometimes with seeming
vigor and conviction, but in time, she proved to be less stalwart.
In the 1997 case of Blessing v. Freestone,124 the Court in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor unanimously reaffirmed 125 that in order to succeed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a third-party spending beneficiary, a claimant must show not
merely that a funding condition accepted by the recipient had been violated, but
also that the violated condition had been clearly and unambiguously designed by
Congress to create a specific obligation in the recipient for the benefit of the
claimant. In other words, as had been held before, the violated condition must
be shown to bestow upon the claimant a federal "right" to receive the benefit
which the funds-recipient had withheld. 126 The Court also reiterated that redress
under § 1983 would not be available if it were statutorily foreclosed, either
expressly or by inference from a perceived inconsistency between § 1983 actions
and the overall enforcement scheme provided for the funding program involved.
None of this was new, nor was it necessarily dependent upon accepting or
rejecting the contract thesis.
However, while Justice Scalia joined the unanimous Blessing opinion, he
added some additional paragraphs which Justice Kennedy joined. These two
could join the Court's opinion, Scalia explained, only because it left open "the
possibility that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie." 127  Scalia had
played this theme beforef 28 (and, as we shall see, he later would play it again).
Invoking Pennhurst's emphasis on the contractual character of federal funding
agreements, Scalia in Blessing observed that third-party beneficiaries seem not to
123. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
124. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
125. The Justices were asked to overrule the Thiboutot case; but as that point had been neither
litigated below nor raised in the certiorari petition, the Justices declined to consider it.
126. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Auth., 496
U.S. 498, 509 (1990) and Wright v. Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)).
127. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350.
128. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, concurring); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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have been able to sue for contract enforcement in the period when what is now
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, so that "[a]llowing third-party beneficiaries of
commitments to the Federal Government to sue is certainly a vast expansion" of
what Congress could have intended when it enacted § 1983.129
In 1998, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,130 the
Supreme Court considered a claim against a school district under Title IX.131 At
issue was whether the school district could be held liable for sexual harassment
of a female eighth-grade student by a teacher in its employ. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer urged in dissent that the agency principle of
respondeat superior should be used to establish such liability, as it is under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
however, the majority pointed out that Title IX was patterned not after Title VII,
but rather after Title VI 3 3 of that 1964 Act,
conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not
to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds. That contractual framework
distinguishes Title IX from Title VII, which is framed in terms not of a
condition but of an outright prohibition.... Title IX's contractual nature
has implications for our construction of the scope of available remedies.
When Congress attaches conditions to the award of federal funds under its
spending power ... we examine closely the propriety of private actions
holding the recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance with
the condition. Our central concern in that regard is with ensuring that "the
receiving entity of federal funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a
monetary award."
' 134
"Consequently," said the Gebser majority,
in cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient
entity, we hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless
an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's
behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs
and fails adequately to respond.
We think, moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate
indifference to discrimination .... Under a lower standard, there would
be a risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own
official decision but instead for its employees' independent actions. 
135
Three cases decided at the next term, however, illustrate that such strong
and clear expressions of the contract thesis were not always forthcoming. The
last of these argued, but the first decided, was National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
129. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350.
130. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
133. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
134. Id. at 286-87 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992)).
135. Id. at 290-91.
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v. Smith, 136 where the Justices unanimously agreed that "[d]ues payments from
recipients of federal funds... do not suffice to render the dues recipient subject
to Title IX."' 137  Had it seemed necessary to fully explain their reasons, the
proponents of the contract thesis surely would have repeated that only a recipient
could have had the opportunity to accept or reject the funding condition.
However, the same result in the case could as easily be reached by construction
of Title IX itself - which by its terms reaches only educational programs and
activities "receiving Federal financial assistance," 138 and not organizations that
receive money from those who receive the federal funds. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion for the Court followed the latter track, which all of the Justices -
whether accepting the contract thesis or not - could comfortably ride.
In the second relevant case at the 1988 Term - Cedar Rapids Community
School District v. Garret F., 139 _ the opinion of the Court was written by Justice
Stevens; but all of the others except Justices Thomas and Kennedy joined. Like
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in N.C.A.A., Justice Stevens' opinion in Cedar
Rapids treated the question as one of ordinary statutory construction, 14 0 and
made no reference at all to Pennhurst or to concepts of contract. Nonetheless,
only Justices Thomas and Kennedy thought it necessary to point out that,
because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 14 1 was an
exertion of Congress' spending power, the analysis
is governed by special rules of construction. We have repeatedly
emphasized that, when Congress places conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, "it must do so unambiguously" [quoting Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)]. This is because a
law that "condition[s] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the
recipient . . . amounts essentially to a contract between the Government
and the recipient of funds" [quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 186 (1998)]. As such, "[t]he legitimacy of Congress'
power to legislate under the spending power.., rests on whether the State
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can,
of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it" [quoting
Pennhurst]. . . . It follows that we must interpret Spending Clause
legislation narrowly, in order to avoid saddling the States with obligations
that they did not anticipate. 1
4 2
The majority opinion, instead of applying the contract thesis, said the
recipient school district was obligated by a quite unspecific "related services"
136. 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
137. Id. at462.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
139. 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
140. See id. at 77. "[O]ur role in this dispute is to interpret existing law." Id. at 79 (emphasis
added). "Under the statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the District must fund such
'related services' in order to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated into the public
schools." Id. (emphasis added).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000).
142. Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 83-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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requirement attached to the funds it had accepted, to provide continuous, one-on-
one specialized health care and services throughout the school day for a child
whose spinal cord injury would otherwise have prevented him from remaining in
school. But three of those otherwise identifiable as proponents of the contract
thesis - Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor - silently
joined in Stevens' opinion. Yet that does not mean they abandoned the contract
thesis. 143  They might simply have found the "related services" condition
sufficiently specific under the circumstances to satisfy the Pennhurst standard.
Less than three months later, however, in the third of the 1988 Term cases,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were driven to join Kennedy and
Thomas in dissent, while Justice O'Connor not only switched company but
wrote the majority opinion. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,
144
the Court upheld school-board liability under Title IX for peer (i.e., student-on-
student) sexual harassment - although only with what Justice O'Connor
considered strict and effective limitations. 14 5  Presumably Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have voted the same way even without
those limitations; but without O'Connor they were not a majority, so they put up
with the limitations - and with her argument that they ensured consistency with
Pennhurst and Gebser, for example.
14 6
Joining Justice Kennedy in dissent, however, the other proponents of the
contract thesis rigorously 14 7 and even ruthlessly declaimed O'Connor's opinion
143. After all, even the dissent by Justice Thomas contained statements appropriate to statutory
construction rather than contract interpretation. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 79 (stating "the
constitutionally mandated rules of construction applicable to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress'
spending power") (emphasis added). Id. at 83 (declaring that "our analysis of the statute in this case is
governed by special rules of construction") (emphasis added). Id. at 84 (noting that "we must interpret
Spending Clause legislation narrowly") (emphasis added).
144. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
145. Id. at 650. O'Connor said that
funding recipients are properly held liable in damages only where they are deliberately
indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.
Id. And, she protested, "The dissent fails to appreciate these very real limitations on a funding
recipient's liability under Title IX." Id. at 652.
146. See id. at 639-40.
147. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside of "Article I's
'enumerated legislative fields' by attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds. So
understood, the Spending Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has
the potential to obliterate distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power
by permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state
concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach.
A vital safeguard for the federal balance is the requirement that, when Congress imposes a
condition on the States' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so unambiguously" [citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)]. As the majority
acknowledges, "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract," and the legitimacy of Congress' exercise of its power to condition funding on state
compliance with congressional conditions "rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the 'contract .... '. There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance [of the
terms of the putative contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the
legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it."'
Our insistence that "Congress speak with a clear voice" to "enable the States to exercise their
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for the Court, insisting that while it purported to defend contract thesis
principles, "it eviscerates the clear-notice safeguard of our Spending Clause
jurisprudence." 14 8 Indeed, O'Connor's opinion now drove Kennedy to repeat a
proposition in which he, as well as Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, had joined before: that "[w]hether the Court ever should have
embarked on [the endeavor of defining implied causes of action] under a
Spending Clause statute is open to question."
149
Three years later, O'Connor's compromise of her commitment to the
contract thesis was manifested again in Barnes v. Gorman. 15  A jury had
awarded a paraplegic not only $1 million in compensatory damages, but also
$1.2 million in punitives, for injuries resulting from treatment in violation of
both § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 15 1 and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.152 With no dissent, the Court reversed the
punitive award; but their agreement on outcome did not conceal the Justices'
disagreement over rationale.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found no need in Gorman either to
question or to reaffirm the concept of "implied" third-party-beneficiary claims
under spending conditions. The text of both the ADA (which did not condition
spending) and the Rehabilitation Act (which did) expressly authorized
enforcement by remedies coextensive with those available in private causes of
action under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and while beneficiary suits
under the latter initially had been judicially inferred, Congress later had ratified
that inference. 153  Consequently, the third-party cause of action claimed in
Gorman could be treated as one expressly conferred. (Again, however, as in
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation," is not based upon some
abstract notion of contractual fairness. Rather, it is a concrete safeguard in the federal system.
Only if States receive clear notice of the conditions attached to federal funds can they guard
against excessive federal intrusion into state affairs and be vigilant in policing the boundaries of
federal power. Cf [South Dakota v.] Dole, [483 U.S. 203,] at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If
the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the general welfare, the reality,
given the vast financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives
'power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to
become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-
imposed' [quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78, (1936)]. While the majority
purports to give effect to these principles, it eviscerates the clear-notice safeguard of our
Spending Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 655.
The majority's opinion purports to be narrow, but the limiting principles it proposes are illusory.
The fence the Court has built is made of little sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of
liability now set in motion. The potential costs to our schools of today's decision are difficult to
estimate, but they are so great that it is most unlikely Congress intended to inflict them.
Id. at 657. "Its multifactored balancing test is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending Clause
legislation." Id. at 675. "[T]he majority's watered-down version of the Spending Clause clear-statement
rule is no substitute for the real protections of state and local autonomy that our constitutional system
requires." Id. at 686.
149. Id. at 685.
150. 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
153. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
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Franklin, 154 the underlying constitutional question of Congress' power to create
such third-party claims seems to have been overlooked by all.)
The Justices agreed, however, that the appropriate scope of relief in such
actions - and in particular, whether punitive damages should be allowed - had
not yet been determined; and on this question, Justice Scalia (and Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, all of whom joined his opinion
without separate comment) found the contract thesis decisive. Arguing from
Pennhurst, Scalia noted that "punitive damages ... are not generally available
for breach of contract," 155 and that recipients therefore could not have clearly
foreseen (and consented) that liability for punitive damages could be a
consequence of accepting the federal funds involved.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred only in
the judgment, and on a ground the majority specifically declined to reach: That
the police and police commissioner defendants in Gorman, as government
entities, "are clearly not subject to punitive damages pursuant to our holding in"
a 1981 case they cited.156 Further, Stevens protested that "[t]he Court's reliance
on, and extension of," the contract thesis of "Pennhurst - a case that was not
even cited in petitioners' briefs in the Court of Appeals - is particularly
inappropriate."' 15 7 "Moreover," Stevens added, "the Court's novel reliance on
what has been, at most, a useful analogy to contract law has potentially far-
reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues briefed and argued in this
case."158
The characterization of the contract thesis as only an "analogy," at most,
was no doubt a calculated rhetorical diminution, apparently originating with
those who always had opposed the thesis. The fourth of them, Justice Souter,
joined Scalia's opinion of the Court in Gorman rather than concurring only in
the judgment, like Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; but he did so, he explained,
only because "I agree that analogy to the common law of contract is appropriate
in this instance," and he took pains to declare that "the contract-law analogy may
fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other questions that may be raised by
actions for private recovery under Spending Clause legislation."'
159
Most notable of all, however, is that Justice O'Connor, having already
distanced herself from the other proponents of the thesis, now opted to join
Justice Souter in his very guarded concurrence. Justice Scalia's almost
obsequious acceptance of the "analogy" characterization, 16 his disavowal of
such potentially far-reaching consequences as Justice Stevens decried, 161 and his
154. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
155. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187.
156. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring). The 1981 case was Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247 (1981). See also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex reL Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784-85
(2000).
157. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 192.
159. Id. at 190-91 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., idat 181, 186-87 (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 188 n.2. "we do not imply, for example, that suits under Spending Clause legislation are
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exaggerated ascription of significance to a 1985 opinion by O'Connor, 162 seem
like concessions indulged to secure a majority by deferring peripheral disputes.
The very fact, however, that Scalia and the three who unqualifiedly joined him
went this far to achieve their majority - rather than acquiescing in the alternate,
neutral ground preferred by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer - seems to show how
firmly committed those four Justices are to the contract thesis.
Simultaneously with Gorman, the Court was considering Gonzaga
University v. Doe.f 63 In Gonzaga, a former student brought a § 1983 suit for
damages he attributed to the university's breach of a federal grant condition
prescribed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)
regarding nondisclosure of student records. 164 The Washington Supreme Court
in Gorman had held that, while "FERPA itself does not give rise to a private
cause of action," the nondisclosure provision did confer a federal right which
was enforceable under § 1983.165
The Supreme Court reversed. 166 The majority opinion admitted that some
language in prior opinions could be taken to allow private enforcement actions
under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of
interest that the statute [or spending condition] is intended to protect:
something less than what is required for a statute [or spending condition]
to create rights enforceable directly from the statute [or condition] itself
under an implied private right of action. 167
Fostering that view, said the Court, "is the notion that our implied private right
of action cases have no bearing on the standards for discerning whether a statute
creates rights enforceable by § 1983. ' ' 168 After observing that "[o]ur more
recent decisions, however, have rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights
from Spending Clause statutes[,]"16 the Gonzaga majority said, "We now reject
the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred
right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.... [I]t is rights, not the
broader or vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests,' that may be enforced under the
authority of that section." 170 Moreover, "[t]his being so, we further reject the
suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise." Id. The plurality was
responding to Justice Stevens' suggestion that they were "fearless crusaders[.]" See id. at 193 n.2
(Stevens, J., concurring). The plurality characterized this intended aspersion as undeserved "praise."
See id at 188 n.2 (plurality opinion).
162. Scalia wrote, "[W]e have been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to
Spending Clause legislation," 536 U.S. at 186, citing Bennett v. Ky. Dept. of Ed., 470 U.S. 656, 669
(1985) (O'Connor, J., writing for the majority), which had simply declined to apply a principle
appropriate to bilateral contracts regarding discrete transactions (i.e., that they should be construed most
strongly against the drafter) to a spending statute creating a complex program of grants to induce
cooperative effort by several levels of government.
163. 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Gorman and Gonzaga were argued on April 23 and 24, 2002,
respectively, and decided on June 17 and 20, 2002, respectively.
164. 88 Stat. 571, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
165. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 400 (Wash. 2001).
166. Id. at 404.
167. Gonzaga. 536 U.S. at 283.
168. Id.
169. Id. at281.
170. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original).
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notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our §
1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied right of action cases should guide the
determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983. " 171
In either case, the Court said, "we must first determine whether Congress
intended to create a federal right[,]' 17 using language "phrased in terms of the
persons benefited" and "with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class."' 173
"Accordingly, where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private
suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action."' 174 "In sum," the
opinion continued, "if Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under §
1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms - no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied
private right of action."' 175 This requirement of clear and unambiguous terms, of
course, is bottomed on Pennhurst and the contract thesis of the spending
power. 176
The majority opinion in Gonzaga was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and joined not only by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, but also by the
less stalwart O'Connor. Unsurprisingly, the four Justices generally opposed to
the contract thesis declined to join the Court's opinion in Gonzaga. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointed out that the majority's conclusion
was contrary to that reached by "all of the Federal Courts of Appeals expressly
deciding the question" with regard to claims under FERPA. 177 While admitting
the language in the particular statutory subsection involved "is not as explicit as
it is in other parts of the statute, it is clear that, in substance, [it] formulate[d] an
individual right." 17 8 Indeed, Stevens asserted, "the right at issue is more specific
and clear than rights previously found enforceable under § 1983" in two other
cases he cited - notwithstanding it took more than a couple of dozen words, for
plaintiff's counsel to articulate the "individual right" being claimed.179
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joined, did not dissent; but he
concurred in the judgment only. Breyer declared that
171. Id.
172. Id. (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 284 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13,
691 (1979)).
174. Id. at 286.
175. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). The Court then continued: "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions
contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve
primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions.
They therefore create no rights enforceable under § 1983." Id.
176. Notice that, by equating the requisites for "rights" enforceable under § 1983 with those for
rights enforceable under an implied private cause of action, the Gonzaga majority avulsed the foundation
of the spurious ruling under § 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980): the notion that third-party
"rights" under spending conditions are "secured by the ... laws," as distinguished from being secured by
a recipient's voluntary agreement. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288-89.
177. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 299. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, N.Y., Police Dept., 106 F.3d
1125 (2d Cir. 1997); Turka v. Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1990).
178. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 294.
179. Id. at 294-95.
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the statute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes
too complex, for any single legal formula to offer more than general
guidance. I would not, in effect, predetermine an outcome through the
use of a presumption - such as the majority's presumption that a right is
conferred only if set forth "unambiguously" in the statute's "text and
structure." 1
8 0
Of course the Gonzaga majority was not really treating the "clear and
unambiguous" criterion as a "presumption"; it was in fact a requirement, one
that the contract thesis logically entails. In any event, however, Justice Breyer
reasoned that "[t]he ultimate question, in respect to whether private individuals
may bring a lawsuit to enforce a federal statute, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
otherwise, is a question of congressional intent[,]" and he and Justice Souter
simply were not convinced "that Congress intended private judicial enforcement
of this statute's 'school record privacy' provisions." 181
Justice O'Connor had joined with the other contract thesis proponents in the
Gonzaga majority; but her divergence from them became evident again in 2005,
in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education. 182 As she had in the Gebser case
seven years earlier, O'Connor wrote for the Court in Jackson. But this time - as
in the 1999 Davis case - it was the Gebser dissenters (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer) who joined her, and the others who had been with her in
the Gebser majority (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) now were left to
dissent. Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion.
The question in Jackson was "whether the private right of action implied by
Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation";18 the majority held that it does,
"where the funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has
complained about sex discrimination." Nodding toward Pennhurst and
Gebser and her own contract-based caveats in Davis, Justice O'Connor affirmed
that third-party actions to enforce spending conditions are available only if a
recipient had notice sufficient for it to have knowingly accepted the risk of
liability."' But that was no problem in this case, she said, asserting that
"Pennhurst does not preclude private suits for intentional acts that clearly violate
Title IX."18 6 "[T]he [defendant] Board should have been put on notice," she
said, "by the fact that our cases since Cannon, such as Gebser and Davis, have
consistently interpreted Title IX's private cause of action broadly to encompass
diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination."' 187 In fact, however, while the
Court had indicated in those cases that "deliberate indifference" to sex
discrimination could make out a Title IX claim, the Court had never addressed
180. Id. at 291 (citation omitted).
181. Id.
182. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
183. Id. at 171.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 181-82.
186. Id. at 182.
187. Id. at 183.
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retaliation (and neither had Congress). 188  Undeterred, however, by that
troublesome truth - and speaking in terms of "statute" (and regulations) instead
of knowing acceptance - O'Connor further weakened the notice requirement by
demanding of recipients a sufficiently "realistic" imagination, saying:
retaliation presents an even easier case than deliberate indifference. It is
easily attributable to the funding recipient, and it is always - by definition
- intentional. We therefore conclude that retaliation against individuals
because they complain of sex discrimination [indeed, even of sex
discrimination against others than themselves!] is "intentional conduct
that violates the clear terms of the statute," and that Title IX itself
therefore supplied sufficient notice to the Board that it could not retaliate
against Jackson after he complained of discrimination against the girls'
basketball team .... The Board could not have realistically supposed that
. . . it remained free to retaliate against those who reported sex
discrimination. 
189
Probably the four Justices who joined her opinion would willingly have
dispensed with O'Connor's curtsy to contract; but once again, without her they
would have lacked a majority. Besides, her gesture was empty enough that it
presented no obstacle to their shared conclusion. Writing in dissent on behalf of
the more earnest proponents of the contract thesis, however, Justice Thomas was
compelling:
For their acceptance to be voluntary and knowing, funding recipients must
"have notice of their potential liability." Thus, "[i]n interpreting language
in spending legislation, we . . . 'insis[t] that Congress speak with a clear
voice,"' and a condition must be imposed "unambiguously." . . . The
question is not whether Congress clearly excluded retaliation claims under
Title IX, but whether it clearly included them. . . . [A]mbiguity is
resolved in favor of the [recipient] States, which must be aware when they
accept federal funds of the obligations they thereby agree to assume....
[Gebser and Davis] hardly gave notice to the Board here that retaliation
liability loomed. 
190"
Indeed, Thomas explained, '"a] claim of retaliation is not a claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex" 191 at all:
At bottom.... retaliation is a claim that aids in enforcing another separate
and distinct right .... [P]rotection from retaliation is separate from direct
protection of the primary right and serves as a prophylactic measure to
guard the primary right .... To describe retaliation as discrimination on
the basis of sex is to conflate the enforcement mechanism with the right
itself[.] 192
Thus, he concluded, "[r]ather than requiring clarity from Congress, the majority
requires clairvoyance from funding recipients. ' 193
188. Id.
189. Id. at 183-84 (internal citation omitted).
190. Id. at 191-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
191. Id. at 185.
192. Id. at 189.
193. Id. at 192.
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What really explains the majority's holding in Jackson is not O'Connor's
genuflect to Pennhurst and its progeny, but rather her determination (and that of
those joining her) to provide what seemed to them to be helpful toward
achieving what they saw as Congress' purpose in specifying the spending
condition involved. It was as bold a display of "I'm-going-to-help-you-whether-
you-ask-for-it-or-not" hubris as the 1964 judicial invention of stockholder suits
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act194 had been - although one might
have thought that kind of judicial wildcatting had been curtailed thirty years ago
by Cort v. Ash. 195 As O'Connor wrote,
Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the use of federal dollars to
support discriminatory practices, but also "to provide individual citizens
effective protection against those practices" [quoting from Cannon]....
[T]his objective "would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if
persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective
protection against retaliation."
196
As Justice Thomas pointed out, such zeal to "help" Congress do better than
it did cannot be squared with the approach taken in the other recent implied
cause of action cases: 
197
By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority
returns this Court to the days in which it created remedies out of whole
cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose. In doing so, the
majority substitutes its policy judgments for the bargains struck by
Congress, as reflected in the statute's text. The question before us is only
whether Title IX prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting it is good
policy. 198
Thus, by the end of the 2004 term in mid-2005, the contract thesis of the
spending power seemed in significant trouble. Four Justices seemed firmly
against it, except that one of them had been willing to use a contract "analogy"
when he considered it useful. Four others seemed firmly committed to it
(although, as we shall see, that does not necessarily mean they understood, or
endorsed, all of its corollaries). The ninth - Justice O'Connor - had become
pretty wobbly: She used the right phrases, but when it came to the point of
decision, she could tip either way.
Chief Justice Rehnquist died September 3, 2005, and was succeeded by
John G. Roberts, Jr., who took his seat on September 29 the same year. It
happened that Roberts was already proficient with spending power issues. As
Principal Deputy Solicitor General he had briefed and argued the 1992 Suter
case for the United States as Amicus Curiae (supporting petitioner, who
194. JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,430-31(1964).
195. 422 U.S. 66, 80-85 (1975) (articulating restrictive criteria for holding private remedies implicit
in statutes not expressly providing for them).
196. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180 (majority opinion) (quoting from the Amicus Curiae Brief of the
United States).
197. See id. at 192-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 195.
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prevailed); 199 and later, while in private practice, he had briefed and argued the
1998 N.C.A.A. case on behalf of that association (which prevailed), 20 and also
the 2002 Gonzaga case on behalf of the University (which prevailed). 20 1
Although to be effective as an advocate one must often be less bold than
academics (and Justices) can afford to be, it is notable that in each of the latter
two cases Roberts' briefs not only relied unabashedly and confidently upon the
contract thesis20 2 - declaring, for example, that "[t]he Title IX contract is the
thread that holds this Court's Title IX jurisprudence together" - but also asserted
that "given its origin" (i.e., not in a regulatory power, but as a condition of
federal spending) "Title IX could extend no further" than to reach actual
recipients of the funds.20 3 "Lack of notice is a basic constitutional impediment,"
he observed, and "[e]xtending federal coverage to entities that merely indirectly
benefit from the federal aid received by others [as the court below had done in
that case] would obliterate this fundamental notice requirement because such
indirect beneficiaries have no reason to know they are covered.. ,204
Five months later, on January 31, 2006, Justice O'Connor's resignation
became effective on the seating of her successor, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito had
sat on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for some fifteen years, and in 2002 had
written an opinion for a 6-5 majority of that court that departed from most other
Circuits in disallowing Medicaid providers (as distinguished from recipients) to
pursue § 1983 claims to enforce Social Security Act conditions. Alito's opinion
held that a federal right, based on Congress' intent to benefit the beneficiary
claimant, is as crucial to a § 1983 claim as it would be to an implied cause of
action. 20 5 That decision preceded by fourteen weeks the Supreme Court's like
holding in the Gonzaga case, discussed earlier. Thus Alito, too, came to the
Supreme Court already a strong proponent of the contract thesis.
Alito would be the first of the two new Justices to address spending issues
in his new role. At the end of the term in June, 2006, he wrote the opinion in
206Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy. Alito's
opinion was joined by the new Chief Justice, as well as by the three continuing,
already-proven proponents of the contract thesis - Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justice Ginsburg conctirred in the judgment, but not in the majority's contract
199. See supra note 114-15 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 163 and 166 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 12, 17, N.C.A.A. v. Smith, 119 S. Ct. 924 (Nov. 10, 1998) (No.
98-84), 1998 WL 784591; Brief of Petitioner at 12-13, 39-43, Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S. Ct.
2268 (Feb. 25, 2002) (No. 01-679), 2002 WL 332055.
203. Brief for Petitioner, N.C.A.A., supra note 202, at 12.
204. Id. at 17-18. Moreover, Roberts argued, "conditions on federal funding implicate not only
contractual concerns but issues of federalism as well," and also "profound separation of powers
concerns." Brief for Petitioner, Gonzaga, supra note 202, at 18. Chief Justice Rehnquist was gone, but
at least on spending power issues, the indications were that Chief Justice Roberts would fit comfortably
in his shoes.
205. Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 821 (2002).
206. 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
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rationale. Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter dissented.
The question in Murphy was whether the fee-shifting provision of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 7 enables those who prevail
in third-party beneficiary litigation enforcing IDEA provisions to recover the
cost of expert consultants retained in connection with IDEA administrative
proceedings. 2 08  The case turned on the meaning of the word "costs" for
purposes of the IDEA.
20 9
The dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, which Justices Stevens and Souter
joined, adduced strong indications from the legislative history that Congress had
intended that recovery of expert fees be allowed; and the dissenters urged
construing the statute's language to accomplish that intent. 21  They urged also
that "[t]he Act's basic purpose further supports interpreting the provision's
language to include expert costs."
211
[T]he Act's statutory right to a "free" and "appropriate" education may
mean little to those who must pay hundreds of dollars to obtain it.... To
read the word "costs" as requiring successful parents to bear their own
expenses for experts ... will leave many parents and guardians "without
an expert with the firepower to match the opposition," a far cry from the
level playing field that Congress envisioned.
These considerations might have carried considerable weight if the question
were actually one of statutory interpretation; but Justice Alito for the majority
set them aside, explaining:
Our resolution of the question presented in this case is guided by the fact
that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause....
Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal
money to the States, but when Congress attaches conditions to a State's
acceptance of federal funds, the conditions must be set out
"unambiguously." [citing Pennhurst] "[L]egislation enacted pursuant to
the spending power is much in the nature of a contract," and therefore, to
be bound by "federally imposed conditions," recipients of federal funds
must accept them "voluntarily and knowingly" [quoting Pennhurst].
States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are "unaware"
or which they are "unable to ascertain." Thus, in the present case, we
must view the IDEA from the perspective of a state official who is
engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should accept IDEA
funds and the obligations that go with those funds. We must ask whether
such a state official would clearly understand that one of the obligations
of the Act is the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert
fees. In other words, we must ask whether the IDEA furnishes clear
notice regarding the liability at issue in this case.213
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
208. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2457.
209. Id. at 2459-60.
210. Id. at 2466-68.
211. Id. at 2468.
212. Id. at 2469-70 (internal citation omitted).
213. Id. at 2458-59 (internal citations omitted).
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Considering the term "costs," as commonly used with regard to litigation, a
term of art that excludes expert fees, Alito wrote that "[c]ertainly the terms of the
IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed to attach such a
condition to a State's receipt of IDEA funds." 214 Noting that the Court in other
cases had applied this same construction to "virtually identical" statutory
language, he concluded that it "does not unambiguously authorize prevailing
parents to recover expert fees."
215
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, but she concurred in the
majority opinion only insofar as it relied on the terms of the IDEA and the
support of other cases. 2 16 As to the majority's reliance on the contract thesis,
Ginsburg objected that "no 'clear notice' prop is needed in this case given the
twin pillars" on which she chose to rely, and "on which the Court's judgment
securely rests." 217  Her continued opposition to the contract thesis is evident
from her insistence that "Pennhurst's 'clear notice' requirement should not be
unmoored from its context" - a context she conceived narrowly as "an
unexpected condition for compliance - a new [programmatic] obligation for
participating States.
' 218
For their part, the three other opponents of the contract thesis vigorously
insisted in the Murphy dissent2 19 that the obligatory force of spending conditions
derives not at all from contract, but rather from Congress' legislative power.
Conceiving the task as one simply of statutory construction, Justice Breyer
wrote:
I am perfectly willing to assume that the majority is correct about the
traditional scope of the word "costs." . . . But Congress is free to redefine
terms of art....
... If that is so, the claims of tradition, of the interpretation this Court
has given other statutes, cannot be so strong as to prevent us from
examining the legislative history.
., * That history makes Congress' purpose clear. And our ultimate
judicial goal is to interpret language in light of the statute's purpose. Only
by seeking that purpose can we avoid the substitution of judicial for
legislative will.
214. Id.at2461.
215. Id. at 2462-63.
216. "[A]lthough I disagree with the Court's rationale to the extent that it invokes a 'clear notice'
requirement tied to the Spending Clause," she said, "I agree with the Court's discussion of IDEA's
terms, and of our decisions ..... Id. at 2465 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (internal citation
omitted).
217. Id. at 2464. Ginsburg agreed with the dissenters that reimbursing expert fees "would make
good sense in light of IDEA's overarching goal," but departed from them in her conclusion that
"Congress did not compose § 1415(i)(3)(B)'s text.., to alter the common import of the terms
,attorney's fees' and 'costs' in the context of expense-allocation legislation.... The ball, I conclude, is
properly left in Congress' court .. " Id. at 2465.
218. Id. at 2464.
219. Justice Souter wrote a very brief separate dissent just to emphasize his agreement with Breyer's
distinction in the principal dissent between the minor "detail" at issue in Murphy and the "indeterminate"
but potentially large risk of punitive damages in Gorman - a risk so large that it apparently was the
reason that Souter had indulged a "contract-law analogy" in that one case. Id. at 2466 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). See id. at 2470-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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In my view, to keep faith with that interpretive goal, we must retain all
traditional interpretive tools - text, structure, history, and purpose. And,
because faithful interpretation is art as well as science, we cannot, through
rule or canon, rule out the use of any of these tools, automatically and in
advance.
• . . By disregarding a clear statement in a legislative report adopted
without opposition in both Houses of Congress, the majority has reached a
result no Member of Congress expected or overtly desired. It has adopted
an interpretation that undercuts, rather than furthers, the statute's purpose
220
To the dissenters' statutory construction argument, however, Alito and the
majority had this succinct and particularly powerful reply: "In a Spending
Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both Houses intend
but what the States are clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with
the acceptance of those funds."
2 2 1
It seems safe now to say that adherents of the contract thesis of the
spending power currently comprise a thin, but relatively young and vigorous,
majority of the Supreme Court. So long as this remains true, there is good
reason to expect important additional developments, at least with regard to third-
party beneficiary actions.
Justices Scalia, 222 Kennedy,2 23 and Thomas are already on record as very
skeptical of "implied" rights of action under spending conditions. Moreover
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, has argued against third-party
beneficiary claims even under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the basis of what Congress
realistically could have conceived in the historic jurisprudential context of that
provision. 224 And the new Chief Justice Roberts, as a private advocate, not only
endorsed that argument 2 25 but went even further, saying:
Nor is it clear that the conditions in Spending Clause legislation qualify as
"laws" under § 1983. Such conditions only become operative when the
contract is accepted by a recipient; it is the resulting contract, not the
federal legislation itself, that gives rise to obligations and alleedly
enforceable rights. Section 1983, however, does not cover contracts. 6
220. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2472-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This, of course,
would leave recipients subject to surprise by whatever unnoticed "details" might remain hidden in the
darkness of statutory prose until teased out by "artful" judicial "interpretation" - an "art" whose only
masters are Justices "faithful" to designs which some in Congress might have entertained, but which
they failed to make evident enough for prospective recipients (or their lawyers) to perceive.
221. Id. at 2463 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
222. E.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 350 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
majority opinion leaves open "the possibility that third-party beneficiary suits simply do not lie.").
"[W]e... perhaps ought to abandon the notion of implied causes of action entirely .... " Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
223. "Whether the Court ever should have embarked on this endeavor under a Spending Clause
statute is open to question." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 685 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
224. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Brief for Petitioner, Gonzaga, supra note 202, at 40-41.
226. Id. at 42 n.14. For this proposition, Roberts' only citation was: "Cf United States v. Morgan,
230 F.3d 1067, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (Congress may indirectly regulate state conduct by attaching strings
to grants of money given to state and local governments, but those strings aren't laws.') (Bye, J.,
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The mistreatment of spending conditions as "laws," of course, was the critical
error that set up the hijacking of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for spending beneficiary
claims in the Thibotout case.
22
Apart from § 1983, certain other statutes have been read as intending to
confer (or to confirm) third-party claims under spending conditions; 22 but the
Supreme Court has yet to address the serious constitutional question of
Congress' power (or lack of power) to prescribe rights and obligations as
between recipients of its largesse and third persons. It seems all but inevitable
that this question will be forced to decision before long.
To create legal rights or obligations requires power to make law - and to
make law governing the activity or relationship to which the legal rights or
obligations pertain. Without lawmaking power, one might oblige another by
contract to perform for the benefit of a third; but to make that performance -
owed to a contracting party - a performance legally owed to the third party (a
stranger to the contract), so that the third party has a legal right to that
performance, requires more than a power to contract. A number of states have
created third-party rights on this model, which they can do by virtue of their
general lawmaking competence; but our national government has lawmaking
competence only within such limits as the Constitution ordains, and not even the
"necessary and proper" clause gives it lawmaking power to effectuate extraneous
ends. 2
29
Congress might well have power to create third-party rights against "state
actors" to help enforce those spending conditions that are designed, for example,
to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as to private actors (like the
University of Chicago in the Cannon case), and even as to state actors where
constitutional rights are not involved, no viable rationale has yet emerged. If
none can be found in candor, it would not mean the end of third-party spending
beneficiary claims; it would only mean leaving them to the laws of the various
states - where the Supreme Court in the Miree case unanimously had said they
belong. 23  If it be said that "federal rights" should not be abandoned to state
remedies, the ample answer is that any rights that federal spending beneficiaries
might have against federal spending recipients are not 'federal rights" where
Congress has no power to confer them; and not even the fact that Congress
propounds them with unmistakable clarity, specificity, and rigor can overcome a
deficiency of power.
With the Supreme Court's present membership, it seems reasonable to
concurring) (emphasis in original; citation omitted), cert. denied 534 U.S. 825 (2001)."'
227. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
228. E.g., the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2000), which
Justice Scalia (with Rehnquist and Thomas), concurring in the judgment in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 504 U.S. 60, 78 (1992), viewed as validating the Title IX cause of action inferred in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See supra note 122 and accompanying text. See
also Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
229. See Engdahl, supra note 3, at 13-26.
230. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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anticipate new developments beyond third-party beneficiary issues, too. This is
not a certainty, of course: It was Justice Scalia, after all, joined by his fellow
contract thesis proponents, who said "we have been careful not to imply that all
contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation," 2 3 1 and "[w]e do not
imply... that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or
that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise. ' 23 2  Those
statements in Barnes v. Gorman might have been tactical concessions only for
the purposes of that case, 233 but they might also reflect hesitation on the part of
some proponents themselves. It is true, however, that apart from contract
Congress has no power at all to impose many of the most prominent conditions
accompanying federal funds. As reflection pressures judicial minds toward
consistency, this ought to lead to applying the contract thesis to other issues as
well.
It nonetheless must be observed that some occasions for application of the
contract thesis have been missed during the past few years, and perhaps not even
noticed by its proponents on the Court.
One example is the 2004 case of Sabri v. United States.234 There, the Court
rejected a facial attack on the federal bribery and embezzlement statute - 18
U.S.C. § 666 - which (among other things) outlaws bribes of organizations (or
their agents) that receive at least a threshold amount of "grant, contract, subsidy,
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance. ' 23 5 The opinion
of the Court was written by Justice Souter, a known opponent of the contract
thesis; but none of the thesis' four proponents then sitting (five, if Justice
O'Connor is included) called out the glaring error.
Justice Souter wrote in Sabri:
Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate
federal monies to promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and it has
corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, §
8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power
are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft or
on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public
officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars .... Congress does
not have to sit by and accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and
state improbity.2
3 6
231. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (emphasis in original).
232. Id. at 188 n.2.
233. See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
234. 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
235. Id. at 603 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000)). See generally R.W. Garnett, The New
Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2003).
236. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605. The "necessary and proper" clause has recently begun to receive long-
overdue attention from the Justices, most notably in connection with the "commerce clause." This
renaissance began in 1985, when a minority realized for the first time since the 1940s that the later New
Deal holdings, which over time had degenerated into the so-called "affectation" or "affecting commerce"
doctrine, were actually not expansions of the "commerce clause" but conscious and careful applications
of classic "necessary and proper" clause analysis in commerce contexts. The most prominent display so
far was in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), especially Justice Scalia's concurring opinion therein.
See L. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-3, at 802-04 and n.12 (3rd. ed., 2000); Engdahl,
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He added that, in enacting § 666, Congress was "within its prerogative to protect
spending objects from the menace of local administrators on the take." 237
The crucial error 238 in this was Souter's failure to observe that the
necessary and proper clause can only apply where the end to be carried into
execution is - to use Chief Justice Marshall's classic phrases - "legitimate,...
within the scope of the Constitution, ' 239 so as to justify laws "really calculated
to effect" 240 that enumerated end. The federal grant programs involved in the
Sabri case had only objectives which, while worthy, were not "objects intrusted
[sic] to the [federal] government" by the Constitution; 241 they were, instead,
ends extraneous to the federal government's constitutionally contemplated role.
Federal spending may certainly be used to promote extraneous ends; that is the
essence of Hamilton's view. In Hamilton's own words, however, "A power to
appropriate money with this latitude... would not carry a power to do any other
thing not authorized in the Constitution. '242  That was the point made by
Presidents Monroe 24 3 and Jackson, 244 and it was the understanding that
prevailed until the obfuscating confusion of United States v. Butler (repeated in
the Steward Machine and Helvering cases), which confounded this branch of
constitutional jurisprudence until the contract thesis began to re-emerge just
about thirty years ago. Congress is free to secure its extraneous spending
objectives as well as it might by means of contract; but contract is the only
means it has to ensure the accomplishment of its extraneous spending ends. This
- as much as anything about ambiguity, clarity, knowing consent, and informed
choice - is corollary to the contract thesis.
A case very different from Sabri was Salinas v. United States, 2 4 decided
under a different subsection of the same bribery statute just seven years before.
The United States uses imprisonment of violators as one means to enforce
compliance with its criminal laws - which themselves are means of enforcing its
The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107 (1998). The judicial recovery had commenced in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 587 (1985) (O'Connor; J., dissenting) (citing Engdahl,
Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMMENT 93 (1985)). The best judicial
explication so far is Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich.
Several Justices still have far to go, however, toward recovering the classic "necessary and
proper" clause analysis. See, for example, the opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), mistakenly applying
the "rational basis" test appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment for review of legislation that is
presumptively valid, rather than the very different "rational basis" test derived out of McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), and its progeny, for use where validity cannot be presumed but instead
must be established under the necessary and proper clause.
237. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608.
238. We may overlook Souter's conventional attribution of the spending power to the taxing clause.
See supra note 22.
239. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
240. Id. at 423.
241. Id.
242. HAMILTON, supra note 28. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
244. See supra text accompanying note 34.
245. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
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will on various matters within its enumerated powers. The United States
arranged for some federal prisoners to be housed in a Texas county jail in
exchange for a grant to fund jail improvements and a per diem payment for each
prisoner so housed. One prisoner bribed Sheriff Salinas to allow him "contact
visits," sometimes with his wife and sometimes with his girlfriend. The Sheriff
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 666, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The
explanation given in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Salinas Court, however,
differed very much from that which Justice Souter would later give in Sabri.
Kennedy wrote:
[T]here is no serious doubt about the constitutionality of § 666(a)(1)(B) as
applied to the facts of this case. Beltran was without question a prisoner
held in a jail managed pursuant to a series of agreements with the Federal
Government. The preferential treatment accorded to him was a threat to
the integrity and proper operation of the federal program. Whatever
might be said about § 666(a)(1)(B)'s application in other cases, the
application of § 666(a)(1)(B) to Salinas did not extend federal power
beyond its proper bounds. See Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256,
259 (1927)....
We simply decide that, as a matter of statutory construction, §
666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in
question had any particular influence on federal funds and that under this
construction the statute is constitutional as applied in this case.
24 6
The Westfall case cited by Justice Kennedy clearly makes the constitutional
point. There, a federal statute punishing misapplication of funds belonging to
member-banks of the Federal Reserve System was held valid as applied to the
misapplication of the funds of a state bank which had opted to become part of
the system - and thus to become a federal instrumentality for the federal fiscal
ends of the Federal Reserve.24 1 "[T]he United States may punish acts injurious
to the System," said the Court, "although done to a corporation that the State
also is entitled to protect. ' 248 At the specific page that Justice Kennedy cited in
Salinas, the Westfall Court had explained: "Congress may employ state
corporations with their consent as instrumentalities of the United States, and may
make frauds that impair their efficiency [as such federal instrumentalities
federal] crimes." 249 Like the member-bank in Westfall, the Texas jail in Salinas
was being used (pursuant, of course, to the necessary and proper clause) as an
instrumentality toward ends that are within the federal Government's
enumerated powers; it was that - not the bare fact of federal funding - that
justified the holding in Salinas.
The same could not be said as to Sabri, where the object being promoted by
the federal spending program was extraneous to the enumerated powers. As to
extraneous "objects behind federal spending, ' 25° by definition the only "federal
246. Id. at 60, 61 (emphasis added).
247. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 257-58 (1927).
248. Id. at 258.
249. Id. at 259.
250. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 52 S.D. L. Rev. 531 2007
SOUTH DAKOTA LAWREVIEW
interest" 25 1 involved is a constitutionally immaterial one. Therefore, except
insofar as it brigades such extraneous federal interests with sufficient,
enforceable contract terms, Congress might indeed "have to sit by and accept the
risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity"; 25 2 the necessary and
proper clause authorizes "Laws" only "for carrying into Execution" the
governance powers of Congress and the other branches.
Another case illustrating the same point as Salinas (in contrast to Sabri),
although it did not involve the bribery statute, was the 2000 case of Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin.253 The Highway Safety Act of 1973 created
the "Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program," which offers federal funds
to states for projects including the installation of warning devices "adequate" to
diminish rail crossing hazards. 254 The Secretary of Transportation issued a
regulation establishing a "standard of adequacy" for such devices; and in
Shanklin the Supreme Court construed that standard of adequacy as "mandatory
for all warning devices installed with federal funds."255 Further, the Shanklin
Court held that state law tort actions alleging deficiencies in devices that comply
with the mandatory federal standard of adequacy are preempted, barred by the
Supremacy Clause.
256
This might seem on its face to indicate that federal requirements
accompanying federal funds can displace otherwise applicable state laws,
because of the federal funding. This might be taken to mean that Congress' will
can preempt state law by inducing compliance with its will by spending. That,
however, would be to grossly misread Shanklin.
Interstate rail transportation is wholly within Congress' commerce power.
For well over a century it has been understood that - by virtue of its necessary
and proper clause power in conjunction with its commerce power - Congress
can regulate even local activities as a means to effectuate its will for interstate
transport, including its safety. At the beginning of her opinion for the Court in
Shanklin, Justice O'Connor pointed out that Congress had exercised this
"necessary and proper" clause power three years earlier by enacting the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 "to promote safety in every area of railroad
operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents."257 That 1970
Act had directed the Secretary of Transportation to "maintain a coordinated
effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem."
As O'Connor also pointed out, it was that 1970 Act that specified that
[1Iaws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally
uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force
a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of
251. Id. at601.
252. Id. at 605.
253. 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
254. 23 U.S.C. § 130 (2000).
255. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 353 (emphasis in original).
256. Id. at 358-59.
257. Id. at 347 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20101 (2000)).
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Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the
subject matter of the State requirement.258
The subsequent 1973 Act, including its "Federal Railway-Highway Crossings
Program" involved in the Shanklin case, made federal funds available to advance
the earlier statute's grade crossing safety policy. Because the Secretary of
Transportation's "standard of adequacy" regulation was written specifically for
that particular funding program, it can hardly be surprising that it was limited by
its terms to federally-funded warning devices. What entailed supremacy for the
standard-of-adequacy regulation, however, was not that it happened to be
associated with federal funding, but rather that (like the funding itself) it was
designed to serve as a means to help "develop and carry out [nationally uniform]
solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem," 2 59 as contemplated by the
1970 Act. Consequently, the standard-of-adequacy regulation could easily pass
muster under the necessary and proper clause as a means to effectuate Congress'
will for safety in interstate commerce.
While both Shanklin and Salinas, in contrast to Sabri, are consistent with
the contract thesis, there still is reason to wonder how alert the Justices will
consistently be to its ramifications. Consider, for example, what happened in
Fischer v. United States, 26 another case under the bribery statute that was being
considered by the Court at the same time as Shanklin (the railroad crossings
case). Fischer was decided just four weeks after Shanklin, and the Court's
opinion in Fischer was written by Justice Kennedy, who had written the Salinas
opinion just three years before. Unfortunately, Kennedy's opinion in Fischer
was less well-considered, and quite unsound.
Fischer upheld the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666 of a consultant who
had defrauded a municipal hospital authority that operated two hospitals
receiving federal funds under the Medicare program.2 6 1 The Court rejected a
statutory construction argument made in the consultant's defense, but Kennedy's
rationale in so doing exhibited the same error that Justice Souter was to make
later in Sabri.2 6 2 The underlying constitutional point had not been identified or
briefed by counsel in Fischer, nor did it draw any comment from even a single
Justice. No one, it seems, saw the elephant in the room!
26 3
In the course of responding to the consultant's statutory argument, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court:
Medicare is designed to the end that the Government receives... long-
term advantages from the existence of a sound and effective health care
system for the elderly and disabled. The Government enacted specific
statutes and regulations to secure its own interests in promoting the well
being and advantage of the health care provider, in addition to the patient
258. Id. at 347-48 (citing 49 U.S.C. §20106 (2000) (emphasis added)).
259. Id. at 347 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20134 (2000)).
260. 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
261. Id. at 681-82.
262. Id. at 677.
263. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in Fischer, but only on statutory grounds.
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who receives care....
The Government has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting
financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpetuated upon Medicare
providers. Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity. They raise
the risk participating organizations will lack the resources requisite to
provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program. Cf
Salinas, 522 U.S., at 61 (stating that acceptance of bribes by an official of
a jail housing federal prisoners pursuant to an agreement with the
Government "was a threat to the integrity and proper operation of the
federal program"). 264
But the federal government's "interest" in Medicare - unlike its interest in
the penal confinement of criminal violators of federal laws - is no different in
constitutional significance from the "interest" in maternal and infant health that
led Congress to enact the Maternity Act in 1921.265 Neither is within Congress'
enumerated powers; maternal health and Medicare both are "extraneous." We
can be grateful that Congress shows "interest" in them, and politically we might
insist that it provide for them suitably; but they are not among the matters with
regard to which the federal branches are constituted as our overnment, with
competence - backed by the "supremacy clause" - to control.
24
The law distinguishes between one's legal interests (for example, in
property) and one's interest in good government - or, indeed, one's interest in
sports; and it likewise distinguishes between the federal government's interest in
interstate trade, national security, or the postal system, for example, and its
interest in the health, nutrition, and well-being of people. When Congress acts
"for carrying into Execution" its interstate commerce policy, for example, the
supremacy clause prevents interference with its will; but when Congress acts to
advance maternal and child health, for example, "that purpose may be effectively
frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding."
267
Justice Kennedy in Fischer described the Government's interest in
Medicare as "legitimate and significant"; and so it is, but only in the same sense
that one might have a legitimate and significant interest in the well-being of an
unrelated friend. Regardless of how permissible, important, motivating, or
compelled by humanitarian considerations, such interests have no legal,
including constitutional, relevance. Unless an enumerated-power objective is a
target (and apart from contractual considerations), the Government's "interest"
in Medicare is no more than that of a donor. A donor may curtail his largesse if
displeased with what ensues, and so may the United States; but a donor's
264. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 680, 680-82.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
266. Westside Mothers v. Havemen, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561-89 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Judge Cleland
endorsed the contract thesis and realized that it precludes application of the supremacy clause to
extraneous spending programs). To the relief of Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer, concurring in
the judgment of Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 192 n.2 (2002), the Sixth Circuit rejected Judge
Cleland's rationale, in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2002). Now,
however, the position of Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer is more distinctly the minority view.
See generally Westside Mothers v. Olszewksi, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006).
267. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
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contribution per se gives him no legal right (apart from contract) to control the
use or abuse of his gift. Moreover, neither donation nor contract can empower a
donor to punish fraud, bribery, embezzlement, or theft detrimental to the
objectives toward which he had aimed his largesse.
CONCLUSION
Congress today probably directs more human behavior by conditions
accompanying federal funding than by any exercise of its legislative powers.
Roughly two-thirds of the federal budget in recent years has been spent on social
security, social and economic assistance, education, and other aid and
development programs - few of which had any counterpart in practice before the
New Deal. Virtually all of these (as well as procurements and other federal
activities involving expenditures) involve eligibility conditions to which
aspirants, to succeed, must conform, as well as conditions that must be agreed to
as consideration for receiving federal funds. Many of these conditions, including
the several anti-discrimination mandates sweepingly employed today, are
peripheral or unrelated to the basic purposes of most such expenditures. And, at
least with regard to private recipients, most are unrelated to any objective the
federal government has legislative power to attain.
The thesis that allows for such adaptation to society's perceived modem
needs, while at the same time preserving the decentralizing and democratizing
virtues of the principle of enumerated federal powers, seems now to be attaining
clear dominance with regard to claims of third-party beneficiaries. Other
corollaries to the contract thesis of Congress' spending power, however, have
not been worked through by the Justices. Predictably, however, they will be -
and sooner, no doubt, if well-prepared advocates lead the way - simply because
where intellects are free, sounder ideas tend, over time, to prevail.
It has been popular now for two or three generations to parrot the "realist"
claim that constitutional law is politics and Justices can (and should, if they
share enlightened policy predilections) reshape and embellish the Constitution as
their wisdom leads. Fiat premises, 26 8  leaps of logic, 2 69  and plain
contradictions 2 7 have been indulged when the immediate results have seemed
desirable; it therefore should be no surprise that subtler errors - like the
confusion that Cardozo's Social Security opinions shared with Butler, and the
mistaken characterization of spending as a "legislative" power - endured so
long. It has been my observation, however, over more than forty-five years as a
268. Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has gradually been rediscovering the role of the
necessary and proper clause outside the spending power area - for example, in the commerce power
realm. The most recent evidence is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and especially the concurring
opinion of Justice Scalia therein. This rediscovery on the part of most of the Justices, however, is still
quite imperfect. TRIBE, supra note 236, at §§ 5-3, 5-4. See generally Engdahl, supra note 236.
269. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See
generally Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473
(1962); Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for Keeping; A Time
for Throwing Away? " 47 KAN. L. REv. 61 (1998).
270. E.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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practitioner and a scholar of constitutional law and constitutional history, that
careful, critical, and perceptive application of principled legal analysis, so far
from being "formalistic," can more persuasively (and thus more effectively and
enduringly) not just maintain, but refine, adapt, and improve established
conceptions and institutions to promote greater freedom, opportunity, fairness,
and well-being. This essay is offered as an illustration of the kind of scholarship
still needing to be done.
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